2012. Biosecurity and food security: spatial strategies for combating bovine tuberculosis in the UK.
Concern over the spread of infectious animal diseases has led to attempts to improve the 8 biosecurity behaviour of farmers. Implicit within these behavioural change strategies are 9 different geographies of knowledge that enact different versions of disease. Some versions 10 are fixed whilst others attempt to live with disease by accommodating difference. This paper 11 explores how these different strategies fare in attempts to promote biosecurity to farmers.
12
The pape o pa es fa e s espo ses to high-isk a d populatio st ategies of 13 biosecurity behaviour change in relation to bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) in cattle. Drawing on 14 quantitative assessments of biosecurity and farmer interviews, the paper suggests that 15 biosecurity behaviour change initiatives that draw on locally situated practices and 16 knowledges of disease are more likely to have an impact on biosecurity behaviour than 17 those which attempt to standardise biosecurity and disease. Through a process of constant 18 tinkering and rewiring biosecurity to fit local social and ecological conditions, approaches 19 like the high risk strategy represent one way of living with the uncertainties of disease. It is 20
argued that thinking more broadly about the nature of disease should lead policy makers to 21 re-evaluate the purpose of disease control and their approaches to it. 22 23 24 25 Keywords: Biosecurity; Food Security; Bovine tuberculosis; Geographies of Knowledge; 26 Behaviour change; Animal Disease 27 28 29 30
Introduction 5
A focus on the security of agriculture has not only led to critical analyses of food security, but 6 also the parallel concern of biosecurity -the incursion of infectious disease or disease approaches, attempts to accommodate difference, imprecision and multiplicity, and develop 3 loose gathering[s] of expertise (Hinchliffe, 2007) are preferable to those which seek to 4 purify spaces and maintain strict boundaries around singular versions of disease. In the light 5 of recent biosecurity breaches, these approaches to managing disease may appear 6 o pelli g (Mather & Marshall, 2011 ), yet the concept of living with disease is also vague 7 a d a iguous e ause it is not clear what living with disease means or how a loosely 8 ohe e t p og a ight t a slate i to a o ka le app oa h to a i al health (Mather & 9 Marshall, 2011) . What are the loose arrangements of expertise? How can they feature in the 10 new strategies of behavioural change? And do, for example, farmers respond better to these 11 approaches compared to those that rely on standardised and tighter versions of disease and 12 expertise? These are questions that this paper sets out to examine. 13
14
In linking concerns of behavioural change with ideas of living with disease, the paper 15 explores how two different attempts fare in attempts to promote biosecurity to farmers. 16 Specifically, the paper compares two different strategies for encouraging biosecurity 17 easu es: the populatio st ateg , which provides broad advice across a whole population, 18 a d the o e pe so alised a d i di idual high-isk st ateg in relation to the management 19 of bovine Tuberculosis in the United Kingdom. The paper suggests that these st ategies 20 inherent knowledge practices and geographies have considerable implications for the uptake 21 of biosecurity behaviours but also for understandings of disease and biosecurity. 22
24

Animal disease and behavioural change 25 26
Go e e ts ha e al a s ee i te ested i ha gi g people s eha iou -some more 27 forcefully than others. Regulation has occupied a central role in achieving public benefits, 28 but increasingly it has been seen to provide a poor fit with prevailing neoliberal political 29 ideologies. I stead, ethods of eha iou ha ge ooted i li e ta ia pate alis -30 
2011). 13 14
The same themes apply to animal health. As Enticott et al (2011) explain, the governance of 15 animal health is shifti g to a ds a eoli e al odel of ost a d espo si ilit sha i g . In 16
the UK this involves the Government attempting to restructure a longstanding relationship 17 with agriculture and the veterinary profession in which it previously acted as a guiding 18 partner in the management of animal disease, building veterinary capacity, and defining 19 what diseases were important to manage. Instead, the Government has increasingly sought 20 to devolve the costs and strategic direction of animal disease management to farmers and 21 landowners. As part of this, the UK Government has paid increasing attention to nudge-like 22 ethods of ha gi g fa e s eha iou i o de to o pl with animal disease regulations 23 and improve biosecurity (see for example: Defra, 2012). In this respect, a crucial issue facing 24 the promotion of biosecurity is whether some behavioural change strategies work better and impact upon behaviour has been made most explicit in studies of the public 3 understanding of science (Wynne, 1992) . Similarly, epidemiologists such as Rose (1992 ; 4 1985) recognised that different strategies of preventive medicine have different geographies 5 of knowledge which could be crucial in determining the uptake of the advice contained 6 within them. Rose suggested that there are two main spatial strategies for preventive 7 medicine: the population approach where the strategic focus is a sick population, and the 8 high isk st ateg he e the fo us is si k i di iduals. The population approach focuses on 9 the causes of incidence of ill health in order to control the determinants of incidence and 10 lower the mean level of risk by changing societal norms. In practice it involves the large-scale 11 communication of general and precautionary lifestyle advice, drawn from large scale 12 quantitative analysis of risk factors. This scale of knowledge provides a significant drawback 13 si ila to the e ologi al falla , o hat 'ose alls the p e e tio pa ado -that is a 14 preventive measure which brings much benefit to the population [but] offers little to each 15 pa ti ipati g i di idual (Rose, 1985: 38) . This arises because the populatio st ateg offe s 16 o l a s all e efit to ea h i di idual, si e ost of the e e goi g to e al ight a a 17 (ibid.). As a result, these strategies become demotivating for both patients and physicians as 18 su ess is a ked a o -e e t i id.). 19 
20
Davison et al (1989 ; 1991 ; 1992) argue that the population approach actually encourages 21 dysfunctional health behaviour and link this failure to the scale of medical knowledge. They 22 show that the public develop their own knowledges of ill-health through experience and 23 personal observation of people known to be unhealthy and their circumstances. These 24 observations generate explanatory hypotheses which challenge or support suspected 25 medical understandings of illness (Davison et al, 1991) . The overall effect is to construct an 26 image of an unhealthy person -a a didate -which helps people make sense of their risk 27 of becoming ill, and predicts or explains illness. The prevention paradox is an inherent part 28 of the candidate system because many other factors are involved in illness causation than 29 are recognised in health promotion. The inability to handle fine grained detail leads to the 30 recognition that rules are fallible and there will be exceptions -a gap filled by the role of bad 31 luck and chance. Moreover, this broad scale knowledge is said to enhance these beliefs as 32 the identification of more and more risk factors labels more and more behaviours as 1 pathogenic, leading to the recognition of more and more exceptions. The ironic 2 o se ue e is the efo e that these ultu al o epts a e gi e o e athe than less 3 explanatory power by the activities of modern health educators, whose stated goals lie in 4 the opposite di e tio (Davison et al., 1991: 16). 5 6 B o t ast, the high-isk st ateg pla es p e e ti e edi i e i a o e lo alised a d 7 contextual environment. The approach deals with sick individuals by providing appropriate 8
i te e tio s ele a t to those i di iduals ho ha e ee ide tified as at isk follo i g 9 medical screening. The communication of risk and the identification of actions usually occur 10 on a one-to-one basis, so that advice can be personalised and tailored to situational factors. 11
The high risk strategy also helps to address these social concerns by providing a more 12 built up over time (Gilson, 2003) . Even when the consequences of medical uncertainties are 22 laid before patients, trust can persist out of recognition of these complexities or an 23 i e ita le eed to ha e faith i edi i e, o ha is ati autho it , at so e poi t i o e s 24 life (Lupton, 1997 ; Lupton, 1996) . This is not to say that there are not problems with this 25 approach: the doctor-patient relationship may not always be so productive. Moreover, it is 26 expensive, does not deal with the root causes of ill-health, only protects those who are 27 already vulnerable to illness and requires individuals to change their lifestyle contra social 28 norms (Rose, 1985) . 29
30
In emphasizing the way solutions are moulded by context, the high risk approach is similar to 31 other theories of health promotion, as well as resonating with the broader concept of living 32 with disease. Firstly, other theories of health promotion stress the need to understand the 1 local social and ecological contexts of human behaviour (Stokols, 1992) . This helps create 2 interventions that are locally situated and culturally compelling because they create a sense 3 of community ownership and are matched with local priorities (Panter-Brick et al., 2006). 4
Here there are similarities to approaches to resolving environmental challenges facing 5 farmers. In agriculture, the complexity of both the social and ecological environment means 6
that the e a e o si gle p o le s, o si gle solutio s, no single extension strategies, and no 7 est ediu that e te sio should solel e og ise (Vanclay, 2004: 214) . As farmers are 8 work with different farming rationalities, finding a way of engaging with all of them at once 9 remains a challenging task. Instead, appreciating the range of these different farming 10 rationalities and styles and adapting to them may be crucial in generating appropriate at least in one region of South Africa, the disease was managed using lo al e pe ie e ith 27 the disease a d a u de sta di g of ho a ia i flue za affe ts ost i h populatio s 28 (p.162). In practice, this meant farmers attempting to boost the immunity of ostriches during 29 stressful periods, whilst vets adapted a o e size fits all culling policies in recognition that 30 locally, ostriches had previously withstood the disease. Instead, flocks were culled only 31 where infection was seen to multiply. He e e fi d hat e ea li i g ith disease : a 32 recognition of the complexity of disease and its environment, that disease may manifest 1 itself differently across space, and that more nuanced and open forms of prevention, rather 2 than those which are closed and static, may be required to deal with it effectively. 
cows and badgers based on their first-hand experiences of the disease and by sharing these 11 accounts with other local farmers. This candidate system helped to retrospectively explain 12 why farmers had suffered a bTB breakdown and/or to predict who is likely to go down with 13 TB ased o othe fa e s a age e t p a ti es, he e the sou ed replacement stock 14 and/or their farming ability. 15
16
As many of the elements of this system were common to risk factors communicated within 17 the population approach, it was suggested failure to implement biosecurity advice was not a 18 result of a knowledge deficit, but factors connected to the geography of knowledge within 19 the population approach. Whilst the population approach provided generalised and 20 universal advice, at a local level, they farmers suggested that disease was uncertain and 21 complex. The generic advice contained within the population strategy conflicted with their 22 experiences of bTB. Observations of unwanted and unwarranted cases of bTB confirmed 23 that the universal rules of the population approach provided no guarantees of avoiding bTB. 24
Farmers judged to be excellent by their peers would be just as likely to suffer from bTB as 25 those judged to be poor farmers, or following high-risk practices. 26
27
Equally, exceptions to biosecurity rules within the population approach provided further 28 proof that general rules were problematic. Farmers pointed to unwarranted survivals and 29 deaths of cattle from bTB: where it was likely that cattle-to-cattle transmission should have 30 occurred but did not, farmers used these cases to demonstrate that theories of cattle-to-31 cattle transmission were uncertain and provided no guarantees. Closed herds -herds that 32 breed all their replacement stock -were prominent in other examples of unwarranted 1 deaths. A o di g to the ge e al isk fa to s ithi Def a s ad i e, losed he ds were less 2 likely to suffer from bTB. Farmers though pointed to numerous examples of closed herds and 3 other examples of good farming o good fa e s that had suffe ed from bTB breakdowns 4 to demonstrate the limitations of universal biosecurity practices and the difficulties of 5 inspiring behavioural change with broad-scale knowledge. 6 7 Whilst the population approach attempted to suggest universal rules, these experiences 8 came instead to characterise the bTB candidate system as fallible, in which disease incidents 9 were dependent on luck. Set against these exceptions to the rules, the population approach 10 did not encourage biosecurity but instead inspired a sense of fatalism in which nothing could 11 be done to prevent animal disease. Reluctance to follow universal guidelines therefore led to 12 a elia e o fa e s o la epide iologies of disease a age e t. I p a ti e that 13 meant illegal badger culling; missing or delaying bTB tests; and ignoring biosecurity 14 regulations, such as isolating bTB infected cattle. Farmers were discouraged from buying 15 from herds in low risk bTB areas because the stress of moving cattle long distances could 16 make them susceptible to bTB. Restocking from areas with high bTB was seen as safer 17 because of beliefs in immunity and susceptibility gained by cattle living in high risk areas. ultimately, uptake of biosecurity interventions on farms. The expectation was that any 7 improvement of on-farm biosecurity would in turn help to reduce outbreaks of bTB. (see table 1 ). Vets -usually the senior partner who specialised 23 in farm animals -from each of the practices were trained to deliver the risk assessment. The 24 veterinary practices themselves were relatively small, employing on average nine farm 25 animal vets. Following the first risk assessment, the vet and the farmer agreed on three risk 26 factors that were practical to reduce and could be written into an Action Plan for the farmer. 27
The second risk assessment occurred nine months after the first where the process was 28 repeated. Data f o ea h fa s isk assess e t isit e e ollated ithi a E el 29
spreadsheet. 30 31
[Insert table 1 about here] 32 1
In order to gain an understanding of the effectiveness of the ITA, the quantitative risk 2 assessment data was merged with data relating to bTB status and farm size and analysed 3 using SPSS. These data were supplemented with two forms of qualitative data. Firstly, vets 4 were interviewed and work-shadowed as they conducted the risk assessment. Second, 28 5 longitudinal interviews were conducted with farmers. Interviews took place with 14 farmers 6 after their first and second risk assessment visits. Farmers were selected from a stratified 7 sample of the first round of risk assessment scores. Nine farmers improved their biosecurity 8 over the period of the ITA; for three, biosecurity worsened; and for two there was no 9 change. Interviews focused on the experience of being part of the ITA, but also asked the 10 same semi-structured questions relating to understandings of bTB and biosecurity as were 11 posed to the farmers in the population strategy. These data were analysed in the same 12 manner using NVivo. 13
14
Data from the ITA suggest that, empirically, the high-risk strategy can achieve statistically 15 significant improvements in farm biosecurity (see table 2). In the first round of biosecurity 16 assessments, the highest biosecurity score recorded (representing highest risk) was 1544, 17 the lowest was 82 and the mean was 528.39. In the second round, the highest score had 18 fallen to 1407, the lowest had fallen to 71 and the mean had also reduced to 467.55. 19
Comparing individual farms at the start and finish of the ITA reveals a mean level of change 20 of 60.85 in ITA scores (paired t-test: p=.000), an overall risk reduction of 10.69%. The largest 21 reduction in score was 728 (or a 66% reduction). 22
23
Data indicate that the gap between the best and worst biosecurity scores narrowed between 24 rounds 1 and 2. Comparative analysis focusing on farms in the bottom and top quartile 25 biosecurity scores (assessed in round 1) found that during round 1, the mean difference 26 between the best and worst biosecurity scores was 866.90 (p=.000). This decreased to a 27 mean difference of 755.09 in round 2 (p=.000). Analysis of biosecurity scores and bTB status 28 of farms in the ITA also reveals that biosecurity on farms that did not have bTB was better 29 than those that did (p=.001). Amongst the ITA farmers that were interviewed, biosecurity 30 scores fell on average from 552 in round 1 to 490 in round 2. 31
[Insert table 2 about here] 1 2
In Thaler and Sunstein s te s, the scoring system created a kind of choice architecture to 3 guide farmers towards better animal health behaviour. One way the scoring system could do 4 this was by establishing norms of responsible farming and creating competitive behaviour 5 between farmers to have low scores. In fact, although farmers did compare their biosecurity 6 scores, this was not envisaged at the start of the ITA. Moreover, in some cases, farmers 7 misunderstood the nature of the scoring system. Vets in the ITA recounted how one farmer 8 was pleased that his biosecurity was higher (i.e. worse) than his neighbour, commenting that 9 this was because he had never previously beat him at anything. Whilst this may reveal the 10 potential of establishing biosecurity social norms to generate behaviour change, in this case 11 it revealed flaws in the design of the ITA. Indeed, although biosecurity improved, interviews 12 with farmers and vets did not seem to suggest that the scoring system played a significant 13 role in encouraging better biosecurity. Vets involved in the scheme suggested that some 14 farmers misunderstood the scoring system. Few farmers interviewed could remember their 15 fa s iose u it s o e nor did they view them as positive planning instruments, whilst a 16 majority continued to express fatalistic attitudes towards biosecurity and bTB following their 17 assessments. For example, one farmer said: 18
Yes [the et] did sa so ethi g; I a t e e e hat he said. Well hat the hell 19 can we do? The point is so far I might go down next Tuesday but the only thing I can 20 sa is I sti k to hat I e ee doi g all the ea s a d I ot goi g to do that a o 21 that wa a d hope fo the est . 22
23
Nevertheless, analysis of interview data reveals three core themes relating to the 24 understanding and adoptio of iose u it ad i e ge e ated f o fa e s isk assess e t 25 visits. Each of these three themes is specific to an approach to biosecurity that does insist on 26 universal versions of disease, but its malleability that comes from living with disease. They 27 were evident -to varying degrees -within the interactions between vets and farmers during 28 the ITA. Where they were evident, farmers cited them as beneficial elements of the ITA; 29 where vets did not engage with farmers in these culturally appropriate ways, farmers 30 suggested the ITA was poorer for it. Farmers who implemented all or part of their 31 recommended biosecurity actions spoke of their good relationship with their vet, the need 32 for practical and sensible advice and the value of being able to take time to discuss 1 biosecurity. By contrast, farmers that did not implement the advice complained that it was 2
impractical. 3 4
The first theme that links the promotion of biosecurity with ideas of living with disease 5 suggested that a alig e t of e pe tise is important for farmers to implement biosecurity 6 actions. A alig e t of e pe tise e ui es ets to e a le to ha e a u de standing of 7
how farming works and demonstrate their farming competence through their interactions 8 with farmers. This requires vets to discursively demonstrate their knowledge of farming to 9 farmers through a recognition of the situated expertise required to farm effectively. Just as 10 socio-ecological approaches to health promotion suggest, this requires vets to recognise the 11 specificity of each individual farm and match solutions to it, because that is how farmers 12 think about farming. As one farmer commented: 13 you know some say you should do it one way, some say you should do it another 14 way and you know on different farms we have different ways and different land 15 o ks fo diffe e t a i als, it s e ha d to take a pie e of ad i e f o o e fa e 16 and apply it to your own farm because it may not suit. You may try it and you think 17 ell ho did he ake it o k? Be ause it does t o k ith us, that s the t ou le 18 with farming. 19 
20
In this view, the adoption of biosecurity interventions relates to the ability of the vet to 21 fle i l eigh up the limits to biosecurity interventions and identify hat is p a ti al a d 22 se si le fo ea h pa ti ula fa . It is not just natural contingencies that vets need to take 23 into account but also the social, cultural and economic context of the farm and local 24 agriculture. Whilst some biosecurity interventions may make veterinary sense, without the 25 support of the farmer and the wider social environment there is little point suggesting them 26 for they will be rejected. Fa e s for example complained about the penalties in the scoring 27 tool fo ot lea i g a d disi fe ti g o t a to s e uip e t. The a gued that this as ot 28 within their control and, if they were to demand it, the contractors would just laugh and not 29 return. It is in these moments then that vets demonstrate their ability to live with disease: a 30 recognition that biosecurity is not a universal object, but requires fitting to different social, 31 natural and technological relations. At the same time, bTB becomes enacted variously on 32 different farms. On some farms, the disease may be rendered docile easily; in others, these 1 associations mean that the disease takes on additional vigour, but a vigour that must be 2 accepted as part of the relations that are essential for farming life. descriptions of agricultural trials, the ITA opened up a space of experimentation in which 10 disease and biosecurity were not strictly pre-given: they were up for negotiation. The ITA 11 enabled this by providing an opportunity for talk. This opportunity was itself related to the 12 trusting and caring environment established by their ongoing relationship with their vet. As 13 o e fa e said: You a e e e too safe at the e d of the da just fo a hat ith 14 so e od ou a t go o g, a ou? . This discursive approach to solving animal health 15 problems also reveals how farmers view agricultural innovation as non-linear. Talking about 16 biosecurity, for example, may not instantly result in a progressive adoption of agricultural 17 innovations as theories of top-down technology transfer imply (Rogers, 1962) . Instead, 18 talking may lead to trial and error or ideas may sit unused until an appropriate time when 19 the a suit a fa e s eeds (Vanclay, 2004) . Indeed, comparison of interview data and 20 biosecurity scores reveals a complicated relationship between the provision of advice and its 21 implementation. One farmer dramatically improved his biosecurity by following the advice 22 provided but claimed to have done so only so the government could not blame bTB upon 23 farmers. On other farms, biosecurity worsened despite practical advice being offered. 24
However, even here, farmers recognised the value of being able to talk through their 25 problems and build up a stock of knowledge, even though it might not be instantly deployed. 26
One farmer said: 27 I did t eall thi k the ad i e I had as pa ti ula l helpful ut I do t like to so t of 28 say its been no use at all because you know it s only by constantly discussing and sort 29 of p o i g the hole p o le that hopefull so e he e e ll pe haps ha e a 30 breakthrough and find something that perhaps is missing you know missing in our 31 u de sta di g at the p ese t. 32 1 Fi all , fo s of e otio al a e appea to e i po ta t i fo s of iose u it that li e 2 with disease. As Lupton (1997) suggests, the one-to-one relationship between a patient and 3 doctor can generate a trusting relationship which helps to induce health related behaviour. 4
Farmers argued that an important element of the ITA was being able to speak directly to 5 vets. Farmers said that their vet ould u de sta d hat the e e sa i g a d were eas to 6 talk to . The di e t o ta t ith thei et ea t that the could be more honest and open 7 when discussing the risks on the farm. For example, one farmer commented that: 8 if [the ITA] was over the phone… e ould 't e as i te ested. It ould t e like 9 asking him questions because you think oh God, what's he doing the other side? 10
11
The prior relationship between the farmer and vet was also important. Some farmers 12
suggested that their confidence in their vet came from providing help and advice for past 13 problems and helping to resolve the confusions they may have had. Farmers recognised that 14 the physical proximity of the vet in delivering the ITA was important. Not only was it 15 important that they visited the farm, but it was also important that they came from the local 16 area and understood local farming. In other words, for vets to be trusted, they need to have 17 local knowledge. Veterinarian knowledge that came from government vets or through a 18 population style approach as lassed as dista t knowledge and not to be trusted. For 19
example: 20
Leaflets I will read it later and it's gone, you find it months down the line when you 21 come to sorting it…it was much better coming from somebody you know, you 22 respect, trust and has a hands-on experience of the problem 23
24
In trusting their vet, farmers believe that they will do their best for them and look after their 25
interests. This elatio ship of a e is o dou t elated to ets su gi al skills, ut it also 26 relates to their social skills and ability to establish a rapport, as well as their ability to be 27 practical and sensible. The importance of different aspects of ete i a a e i 28 encouraging biosecurity (cf. Law, 2010 ) is therefore related to the first theme of situated 29
expertise. 30 31
Thus, although these results are from a small sample and are deserving of further research, 1 the qualitative evidence from the ITA generally suggested that attempts to accommodate 2 and live with the uncertainties of disease provide more compelling reasons to implement 3 biosecurity than the population strategy. 4 5 6
Conclusion 7 8
At the start of this paper we asked whether approaches to behavioural change could 9 accommodate notions of living with disease. In comparing the high risk strategy and 10 population strategies we are able to draw some conclusions about the extent to which these 11 approaches affect fa e s iose u it eha iou . The two different approaches analysed 12 reveal that the knowledge geographies of strategies of preventive animal health do appear 13 to matter. On the one-hand, the geographically distant and broad forms of knowledge within governance and using trusted social networks to transmit information. In the case of bTB, 28 however, these are unlikely to be enough. This is because it is not simply a matter of a loss of 29 trust, but a loss of hope amongst farmers that the problem will be resolved (Enticott, 30 2008b). The dominance of discourses of luck and fatalism in these accounts instead 31 highlights the extent to which farmers believe animal diseases like bTB are indiscriminate 32 and there is little anyone can do about them by implementing biosecurity -whether or not 1 they perceive themselves to be a good farmer (Heffernan et al., 2008) . Although the data 2 are limited to one before and after study, the suggestion is that high-risk strategies such as 3 the ITA offer farmers hope: they provide a discursive opportunity to talk things through and 4 in doing so receive a form of emotional care from their vet. But with that hope comes a 5 different version of disease: one which must be changeable and adaptable to different 6 social, natural and economic conditions. 7
8
Thus, when approaches to behaviour change seek to work with and adapt to local 9 conditions, it also becomes apparent that biosecurity itself requires constant work and 10 evolution for it to be translated to local situations. Without this reworking and 11 accommodation of different experiences of disease, biosecurity interventions appear to be 12 of little value. This means that biosecurity must always be seen as an outcome of social and 13 ecological negotiations, and that there will always be limits to biosecurity. These are evident contexts is what is important to getting biosecurity to work, then it will also require 31 particular geographies and forms of expertise. As Mather and Marshall (2011) suggest, living 32 with disease is consistent with organising experts so that they become familiar with local 1 variations and practices. However, these geographies of expertise are increasingly under 2 pressure from neoliberal reforms to the veterinary profession (Enticott et al., 2011) leading 3 to centralised concentrations of expertise rather than the localised version required by 4 disease control that attempts to live with disease. But whilst the veterinary profession may 5 play an important role in encouraging biosecurity, what perhaps is more important, are the 6 relevant analytical skills to recognise that whilst biosecurity can be scientifically defined, it is 7 ultimately socially and ecologically applied. 
